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AN (UN)LIKELY CULPRIT: EXAMINING 
THE U.N.'S COUNTERPRODUCTIVE 
ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER 
A KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL 
GERALD v. MAy III* 
Abstract: This Note analyzes the breakdown in the negotiations between 
the United Nations and the Cambodian government over a criminal 
tribunal to try the surviving senior leaders of the 1975-79 Khmer Rouge 
regime. A careful study of the Cambodian legislature's tribunal law and 
the nature of the United Nation's objections to the law reveals that 
Cambodia is not the source of the stalemate. Contrary to prevailing 
Western views and the assertions of several prominent human rights 
organizations, the United Nations is the real stonewalling party, and its 
proposed amendments do not bolster the legitimacy of the tribunal or 
improve its ability to effectively and fairly prosecute Khmer Rouge 
leaders. Recent developments only confirm this view of United Nations as 
an obstructionist. The Secretary General's continuing opposition to the 
tribunal law's framework for domestic/foreign cooperation threatens to 
undermine a tentative agreement on U.N. participation in the tribunal. 
INTRODUCTION 
Injune 1997, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) formally 
requested assistance from the United Nations (U.N.) in establishing a 
tribunal to try living leaders of the Khmer Rouge (KR), a radical com-
munist group responsible for killing almost a quarter of the Cambo-
dian population in the late 1970s.1 This initial contact began a lengthy 
period of intense negotiations that included advice from numerous 
foreign legal experts, the mediation efforts of U.S. Senator John Kerry, 
and a complex set of compromises that secured international participa-
* Gerald V. May III is an Executive Editor of the Boston College Intemational & Compam-
tive Law Review. 
1 See Letter from the Co-Prime Ministers of Cambodia to the United Nations Secretary 
General (june 21, 1997), http:/ /www.ngoforum.org.kh/aboutcambodia/Resource_Files/ 
Tribunal/letter_from_co-prime_ministers.htm. 
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tion while responding to the RGC's domestic sovereignty concerns.2 
After some minor revisions that temporarily delayed its passage,3 a 
comprehensive tribunal law was officially promulgated in August 2001, 
raising hopes that the first indictments and prosecutions would be close 
at hand after U.N. endorsement of the legislation. However, the U.N. 
dashed this expectation when it abruptly pulled out of talks in February 
2002, citing its opinion that the tribunal law failed to "guarantee ... 
independence, impartiality, and objectivity," contravened "international 
standards of justice," and rebuffed the U.N. proposal that U.N. assis-
tance would "be governed by [an] agreement between the U.N. and 
Cambodia. "4 After the departure from the negotiating table, Secretary 
General Kofi Annan stated that the U.N. would not restart talks with 
the RGC unless either the Security Council or the General Assembly 
provided a mandate to do so.5 
Part I briefly reviews the incredible devastation of the KR period 
and the wealth of documentary evidence directly tying senior KR lead-
ers to the so-called bureaucracy of death that terrorized Cambodia in 
tl1e late 1970s. Part II focuses on the hybrid domestic/foreign nature of 
the tribunal, which guarantees meaningful international participation 
in judicial composition, rulings, investigations, and prosecution deci-
sion-making. Part III explores the close fit between the definition of 
war crimes offenses in the tribunal law and the corresponding 
definitions in international conventions and statutes governing interna-
tional criminal tribunals. Part N identifies the U.N.'s concerns about 
five specific areas of the tribunal law, exposing one as a misunderstand-
ing, three others as semantic and formalistic, and the final one as un-
justified because of available legal arguments and recent legal devel-
opments. Part V discusses recent developments leading to a draft 
agreement for U.N. involvement in the tribunal, and reveals how the 
2 See Chronology of a Khmer Rouge Genocide Tribunal, 1994-2001, Cambodian 
Genocide Project (on file with author). 
3 The revision involved replacing the death penalty-which was prohibited by the 1993 
Cambodian Constitution-with life imprisonment as the maximum penalty. See CAMBODIA 
CONST. art. 32. 
4 Statement from the Royal Government of Cambodia in Response to the Announce-
ment of U.N. Pullout from Negotiations on the Khmer Rouge Trial (Feb. 12, 2002) (quot-
ing U.N. Under Secretary General Hans Corell) [hereinafter Statement from the Royal 
Government]. As the U.N.'s chieflegal counsel, Hans Corell has been the point person for 
the organization's negotiations with Cambodian authorities. 
5 See Cambodia to Resume UN Tribunal Talks, BBC NEws, Aug. 22 2002, at http:/ /news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2209063.stm. The General Assembly resolution providing 
such a mandate is discussed in Part V. 
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Secretary General has clung to his objections about the tribunal's struc-
ture and has laid the groundwork for another U.N. unilateral withdrawal. 
I. THE BUREAUCRACY OF DEATH 
During its three and a half year rule, the KR regime-officially 
known as Democratic Kampuchea (DK)-sought to bring Cambodia to 
a "Year Zero" and create an agrarian utopia that bore no traces of mod-
ernity.6 Under the direction of Pol Pot, the KR emptied all urban cen-
ters and forced Cambodians to participate in a crash agricultural col-
lectivization campaign designed to surpass Chinese leader Mao 
Zedong's Great Leap Forward.7 Operating under directives to produce 
more than three tons of rice per hectare, KR cadres turned Cambodi-
ans into indentured laborers who toiled for fourteen hours a day in the 
fields.8 Many of those who were actually able to endure the harsh work 
schedules fell victim to disease, malnutrition, or starvation.9 The impos-
sibility of the DK leadership's agricultural productivity demands was 
matched only by its obsession with rooting out "enemies" opposed to 
the new revolution.10 Initially, the regime focused on individuals con-
nected to the previous Lon Nol government and non-communist 
members of the Cambodian population.ll Also, ethnic minorities 
(Vietnamese, Cham, and Chinese) and religious groups (Buddhists and 
Muslims) were deliberately targeted for destruction.l 2 As Pol Pot's 
scheme for increased agricultural production collapsed, however, the 
leadership's scrutiny turned inward and it conducted a series of inter-
nal purges to eliminate traitorous "microbes" within the KR itself.13 
A recently released report by the War Crimes Research Office at 
the Washington College of Law details the systematic brutality inflicted 
upon those suspected of offenses against the DK regime.14 The report 
6 See BEN KIERNAN, THE PoL PoT REGIME: RAcE, PoWER, AND GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA 
UNDER THE KIIMER RouGE, 1975-1979, at 55 (1996). 
7 Seeid. at44-59,148,167, 294. 
8 See id. at 329; see also id. at 167-68, 174, 179, 181, 188; Seth Mydans, Researchers Put To-
gether Story of the Khmer Rouge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, at 18. 
9 See KIERNAN, supra note 6, at 235-36, 241, 243. 
1° Id. at 336. 
II See id. at 173, 336. 
12 See id. at 460-63; Stephen P. Marks, Elusive justice for the Victims of the Kinner Rouge, 52 
j. INT'L AFF. 691, 695 (1999). 
13 See KIERNAN, supra note 6, at 336, 369-76. 
14 See generally Stephen Heder & Brian Tittemore, SeYen Candidates for Prosecution: 
Accountability for the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge, War Crimes Research Office, Washing-
ton College of Law (2001), http:/ /www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2001/0716 
cmb2.htm. 
150 Boston College Intmwtional & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:147 
documents a meticulous bureaucracy of death in which every prisoner 
was photographed and each extracted confession was prepared in mul-
tiple copies. 15 According to the authors, this evidentiary trail directly 
implicates Pol Pot's inner circle, as minutes of party meetings, reports 
from the killing fields, and official notebooks show that senior KR lead-
ers closely supervised atrocities against Cambodian citizens.16 This ac-
tive management of terror took several forms, including the creation of 
execution policies, the facilitation of suspected traitors' arrests, and the 
transfer of cadre from their divisions for interrogation and ultimately 
elimination.l7 In conclusion, the report states strong prima facie crimi-
nal cases against seven members of the DK regime. 18 
II. TRIBUNAL STRUCTURE 
The proposed Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambo-
dia represent a novel approach to war crimes prosecution.19 Unlike 
the Yugoslavia and Rwanda ad hoc tribunals, which are strictly inter-
national in nature, the KR tribunal combines foreign judicial partici-
pation with the existing domestic judicial establishment in the coun-
try where the offenses were committed.2° Article 9 of the tribunal law 
lays out the basis for this domestic/foreign cooperation by mandating 
a three-tier chamber structure composed of a majority of Cambodian 
judges and a minority of foreign judges at each level; Article 14 stipu-
lates that a judicial decision or order in each chamber must be ap-
proved by at least one foreign judge.21 Thus, while this construction 
recognizes a prominent role for the domestic judiciary, it also effec-
tively addresses concerns about independence, impartiality, and ob-
15 See id. (Executive Summary); David Chandler, Killing Fields, at http:/ /www.cybercam-
bodia.com/ dachs/ killings/ killing.h tml. 
16 See Press Release, \Var Crimes Research Office, American University Washington 
College of Law, (july 16, 2001), http:/ /www.bigpond.com.kh/users/dccam.genocide/7_ 
candidates_for_prosecution.htm. 
17 !d. 
18 See id. 
19 Suzannah Linton, New Approaches to Intmwtional]ustice in Cambodia and East Tintor, 
845 lNT'L REV. m THE RED CROSS 93,94 (2002). 
20 See id. 
21 See Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cam-
bodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampu-
chea (Council of jurists trans., Sept. 6, 2001), art. 14 [hereinafter Tribunal Law]. As con-
templated by the tribunal law, the Extraordinary Chambers consist of a trial court, an 
appeals court, and a supreme court sitting within the regular Cambodian court system in 
Phnom Penh. !d. 
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jectivity by allowing foreign officials to substantially shape the work 
product of the court.22 
Likewise, the provisions on judicial investigations and prosecuto-
rial responsibility ensure compliance with standards of international 
justice by requiring foreign participation at every stage, from deci-
sions on how to proceed to mechanisms for resolving disagreements 
between Cambodian officials and their foreign counterparts.23 To that 
end, Article 23 establishes that judicial investigations are the joint re-
sponsibility of two judges, one Cambodian and one foreign.24 Antici-
pating that the two judges will disagree on some issues, the same arti-
cle also presents a detailed procedure for the resolution of disputes 
that involves the submission of written statements to the Director of 
the Office of Administration and a decision by a Pre-Trial Chamber 
composed of three Cambodian judges and two foreign judges (four 
affirmative votes required). 25 Finally, Article 16 divides prosecutorial 
power between two prosecutors, one Cambodian and one foreign, 
and Article 20 establishes a multi-stage dispute resolution process for 
prosecutorial disputes.26 Indeed, Article 20 requires the same submis-
sion and adjudication procedure found in Article 23 for disputes be-
tween investigatory judges.27 
The law's institutionalization of international involvement in the 
tribunal's operations finds its clearest expression in Article 46, which 
pertains to international personnel vacancies.28 According to the 
terms of this article, the appointment power for foreign judicial 
officials lies exclusively with the U.N., which submits lists of candidates 
for judge, investigating judge, and prosecutor from which the RGC 
authorities must make their selection.29 In the event that these lists 
are exhausted, Article 46 mandates that foreign vacancies be filled 
with candidates recommended by U.N. member state governments.3° 
Only as an absolute last resort-when there is a complete absence of 
available foreign officials-may the RGC appoint domestic personnel 
to fill the vacancies.31 
22 See Linton, supra note 19, at 94. 
23 See Tribunal Law, supra note 21, arts. 16, 20, 23. 
24 !d. art. 23. 
25 !d. 
26 !d. art. 16. 
27 Compare id. art. 20, with id. art. 23. 
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III. FIT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The tribunal law also adheres to international standards of justice 
in its substantive criminal provisions. In fact, the tribunal law's 
definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and individ-
ual/superior criminal responsibility are very similar and in most cases 
identical to the language found in bedrock international agreements 
and criminal statutes.32 Regarding genocide, the tribunal law states that 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide pro-
vides the controlling definition, and a comparison between the two re-
veals an almost word for word match.33 Furthermore, the tribunal law's 
characterization of genocide matches the definition of genocide given 
in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and 
only slightly varies from the definition of genocide in the Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Thgoslavia (ICTY) .34 
A look at the treatment of crimes against humanity reveals a simi-
lar congruence. The tribunal law's definition of this offense exactly 
tracks the definition provided in the ICTY Statute and closely follows 
the definition given in the ICC Statute.35 Finally, the definitions of 
individual and criminal responsibility are also reassuringly similar, 
with the tribunal law making only minor deviations from the core 
language ofboth the ICTYand ICC statutes.36 
IV. THE U.N. OBJECTIONS 
The U.N.'s additional concerns about lack of independence, im-
partiality, and objectivity are less than convincing.37 According to the 
U.N., the tribunal law is specifically defective in five areas: the treat-
ment of the Memorandum of Understanding between the U.N. and 
32 Compare id. arts. 4, 5, 29, with Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, entered into force jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, arts. II, III [hereinafter 
Genocide Convention], and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9*, arts. 6, 7, 25, 28 [hereinafter ICC Statute], and Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former 'lligoslavia, arts. 4, 5, 7, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 
1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTYStatute]. 
33 Compare Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 4, with Genocide Convention, supra note 
32, arts. II, III. 
34 Compare Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 4, with ICC Statute, supra note 32, art. 6, 
andiCTYStatute, supra note 32, art. 4. 
35 CompaTe Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 5, with ICTY Statute, supra note 32, art. 5, 
and ICC Statute, supra note 32, art. 7. 
36 Compare Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 29, with ICTYStatute, supra note 32, art. 7, 
and ICC Statute, supra note 32, arts. 25, 28. 
37 See Statement from the Royal Government, supra note 4. 
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the RGC, the role of foreign defense counsel, the applicable proce-
dural standards, the U.N. appointment power over personnel, and the 
effect of pardons and amnesties on the ability to prosecute.38 This sec-
tion takes each of these objections in turn, and demonstrates that 
none of them has the legitimacy to be a deal breaker that would jus-
tify unilateral U.N. withdrawal from the tribunal formation process.39 
A. Memorandum of Understanding 
The U.N.'s first major problem concerns the RGC's alleged rejec-
tion of the principle that U.N. assistance would be based on an 
agreement between the U.N. and the RGC.40 However, in asserting its 
claim that the RGC has reduced the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) "to the status of an administrative document subordinate to 
the law,"41 the U.N. misunderstands the nature and purpose of the 
memorandum.42 The substantive issues regarding U.N. assistance 
were addressed in the compromise agreements written into the tribu-
nal law, which assure meaningful international involvement through a 
supermajority structure, elaborate dispute resolution mechanisms for 
disagreements between foreign and domestic judicial officials, and 
U.N. control over the roster of available foreign legal personnel.43 By 
contrast, the MoU-which the RGC refers to as the proposed Articles 
of Cooperation and never actually signed-deals with the distinct 
matters of foreign financial and technical support.44 
B. Restrictions on Foreign Counsel 
The U.N.'s second major problem concerns limitations on sus-
pects' right to counsel.45 While Article 24 of the U.N. Draft Statute 
88 See id.; Daryl A. Mundis, New Mechanisms for the Enforcement of International Humanitar-
ian Law, 95 AM.J. INT'L L. 934, 941-42 (2001). 
39 See generally Statement from the Royal Government, supra note 4; Mundis, supra note 
38, at 941-42. 
40 See Statement from the Royal Government, supra note 4. 
41 !d. 
42 See id.; see also Allen Myers, KR Trials: UN's Story Does Not Add Up, PHNOM PENH PosT, 
Mar. 1-14, 2002. See generally Tribunal Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia, reprinted in PHNOM PENH PosT, 
Oct. 27-Nov. 9, 2000. 
43 See Statement from the Royal Government, supra note 4; Myers, supra note 42. 
44 See Statement from the Royal Government, supra note 4; Myers, supra note 42. 
45 See Mundis, supra note 38, at 941; Draft Law on the Establishment of the Extraordi-
nary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed Dur-
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grants suspects a right to counsel of their own choice, the correspond-
ing article in the tribunal law refers only to a suspect's right to assis-
tance of counsel.46 Practically speaking, the tribunal law's omission of 
the phrase "of their own choosing" means that foreign defense coun-
sel cannot personally appear before the Extraordinary Chambers to 
mount a defense on behalf of a suspect.47 However, a countervailing 
factor substantially mitigates this limitation on the involvement of for-
eign defense counsel in the Extraordinary Chambers.48 On a general 
level, the tribunal law does guarantee an unconditional right to assis-
tance of counsel and allows suspects to retain any domestic lawyer 
they desire.49 More specifically, foreign defense counsel can have a 
meaningful role in the proceedings by acting as advisors to Cambo-
dian defense counseJ.5° 
C. The Applicable Procedural Rules 
The U.N.'s third major problem relates to the procedural stan-
dards that will form the basis of the Extraordinary Chambers' delibera-
tions. Article 33 of the U.N. Draft Statute mandates a prominent role 
for international procedural standards by stating that "[g]uidance may 
also, as necessary, be sought in procedural rules at the international 
level. "51 By contrast, the corresponding article of the tribunal law opines 
that "[i]f necessary, and if there are lacunae (gaps) in these existing pro-
cedures, guidance may be sought in procedural rules at the international 
level. "52 
Despite the U.N.'s assertions to the contrary, the language differ-
ence is far from a rejection of international procedural standards and 
an entrenchment of inadequate domestic procedure.53 First, the pro-
cedures for judicial decision-making and the resolution of prosecutorial 
and investigatory judge disputes outlined above contain clear protec-
tions for foreign participation and prevent Cambodian court officials 
from acting unilaterally. 54 Second, Article 35 of the tribunal law already 
ing the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (jan. 2000), art. 24 (on file with author) [here-
inafter U.N. Draft Statute]. 
46 See Mundis, supra note 38, at n. 74. 
47 See id. at 941. 
48 See Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 24; Mundis, supra note 38, at 941. 
49 See Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 24. 
5o See Mundis, supra note 38, at 941. 
51 See U.N. Draft Statute, supra note 45, art. 33; Mundis, supra note 38, at 941. 
52 See Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 33. 
53 See generally id. arts. 9, 14, 20, 23, 33, 35. 
54 See id. arts. 9, 14, 20, 23. 
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provides the procedural guarantees of trial fairness required by inter-
national law (presumption of innocence, right against self incrimina-
tion, examination of prosecution evidence, trial without delay, etc.). 55 
Finally, Article 33 acknowledges an important role for international 
procedural standards by establishing them as a benchmark that the Ex-
traordinary Chambers can consult in areas where the established pro-
cedures provide minimal or unsatisfactory guidance. 56 
D. Restrictions on Appointment Power 
The U.N.'s fourth major problem with the tribunal law involves 
limitations on the Secretary General's ability to appoint personnel 
and fill vacancies.57 While Article 31 of the U.N. Draft Statute states 
that the Deputy Director of Administration-the official in charge of 
recruiting international staff-must be appointed by the Secretary 
General, Article 31 of the tribunal law stipulates that the Secretary 
General must nominate candidates for the Deputy Director post with 
the RGC authorities making the formal appointment.58 The tribunal 
law also omits references to the Secretary General's role in filling for-
eign vacancies as they arise that appear in Articles 12, 21, and 27 of 
the U.N. Draft Statute.59 Yet a careful reading of other articles in the 
tribunal law reveals that the U.N.'s complaint about limited appoint-
ment power is the least meritorious of its objections.60 Articles 11, 18, 
and 26-which concern the selection of foreign officials-expressly 
recognize the U.N. as the sole source of foreign legal personnel and 
confine international appointments and replacements only to those 
candidates on the lists provided by the Secretary General.61 Article 46 
further reinforces the U.N.'s control over foreign appointments by 
stating that the RGC can only fill foreign vacancies on its own under 
the extraordinary circumstance that the candidates on the Secretary 
General's lists and the candidates offered by U.N. member state gov-
ernments are unable to serve.62 
55 Id. art. 35. 
56 See id. art. 33. 
57 See Mundis, supra note 38, at n. 76. 
5s Id. 
59 Compare Tribunal Law, supra note 21, arts. 12, 21, 27, with U.N. Draft Statute, supra 
note 45, arts. 12, 21, 27. 
60 Sec Tribunal Law, supra note 21, arts. 11, 18, 26. 
61 See id. 
62 Id. art. 46. 
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E. Effect of Amnesties and Pardons 
The U.N.'s fifth, and potentially most powerful, objection relates 
to pardons and amnesties as barriers to prosecution.63 The U.N. points 
out that Article 40 of the tribunal law only requires that the Cambodian 
government not request a royal pardon or amnesty for any suspects 
subsequently convicted of offenses within the jurisdiction of the tribu-
nal, and it does not limit the King's ability to grant amnesties or par-
dons on his own.64 Additionally, the U.N. notes that Article 40 is silent 
on the issue of whether an individual who has already received an am-
nesty or pardon can escape prosecution in the Extraordinary Cham-
bers.65 According to the U.N., the absence of such language suggests 
that KR foreign minister Ieng Sary-who was gran ted a pardon for a 
1979 genocide conviction and an amnesty for his membership in the 
KR via a 1996 Royal Decree-maybe immune from prosecution.66 
The first contention is not persuasive because it fails to recognize 
both the legal limitations on the King's ability to grant amnesties and 
the practical restraints on his constitutional authority to grant par-
dons.67 As the founder of Legal Aid in Cambodia has noted, the con-
stitutional provision regarding amnesty and pardons translates as "lift-
ing guilt," implying that the King's power is limited to post-conviction 
pardons.68 Additionally, in light of substantial popular support for 
bringing KR leaders to justice, the King has ruled out royal immunity 
for KR officials other than leng Sary.69 
The second contention also fails on purely legal grounds.70 As the 
founder of Legal Aid in Cambodia has also argued, Sary's 1996 pardon 
is not a bar to prosecution because his 1979 genocide prosecution was 
not valid.71 Because Sary was tried in absentia by a Vietnamese-installed 
puppet government, his trial and conviction-and thus the voiding of 
63 See Thomas Hammarberg, Efforts to Establish a Tribunal Against KR Leaders: Discussions 
Between the Cambodian Government and the U.N., PHNOM PENH PosT, Sept. 14-17, 2002, at 24. 
64 See Mundis, supra note 38, at n.75. Article 27 of the 1993 Constitution vests the King 
with the power to grant immunities from prosecution. CAMBODIA CoNST. art. 27. 
65 See Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 40. 
66 See Hammarberg, supra note 63, at 24. 
67 See Bora Touch, Been Pardoned, but Can Justice Still Stalk !eng Sary 1, KHMER INSTITUTE 
(2002), available at http:/ /www.khmerinstitute.org/articles/art03c.html; Susan Berfield, 
Forget the Killing Fields 1 The Khmer Rouge Defectors Can Only Wish, AsiAWEEK.COM, Jan. 8, 1999, 
at http:/ /www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/99/0108/nat6.html. 
68 See Touch, supra note 67. 
69 See Berfield, supra note 67. 
70 See Touch, supra note 67. 
71 Id. 
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the conviction-had no operative legal effect.72 Even assuming the 
pardon's legitimacy, however, its wording leaves Sary open to prosecu-
tion for genocide and crimes against humanity committed during the 
1975-79 period because the granted immunity arguably only applies to 
post-1979 acts.73 Alternatively, Sary's pardon could be circumvented on 
the grounds that the definition of genocide employed in the 1979 trial 
was considerably different from the definition appearing in interna-
tional conventions.74 Additionally, it would be difficult for Sary to hide 
behind the amnesty component of the 1996 Royal Decree because Arti-
cle 6 of the 1994 Law Outlawing the Democratic Kampuchea Group 
(DK Law) expressly prohibits amnesty for KR leaders.75 Furthermore, 
assuming that somehow Sary could escape categorization as a "leader," 
his amnesty for membership in the KR would still be ineffective based 
on the constitutional limitations discussed above. 76 
Finally, Sary's case for immunity from prosecution fails even if one 
assumes that the King has the legal power to grant amnesty and that 
Sary would not qualifY as a leader for Article 6 purposes. As a matter of 
scope, the amnesty provision of the DK Law arguably covers only the 
crime of membership in the KR itself. 77 Thus, Ieng Sary would be not 
be safe from prosecution for crimes such as murder, abductions, and 
illegal confinement.78 Furthermore, a recent Phnom Penh Appeals 
Court ruling has limited the reach of the DK Law amnesty provision to 
the period preceding the law's enactment in July 1994.79 Therefore, 
even under the further assumption that the amnesty provision went 
beyond membership to include serious criminal offenses, leng Sary 
would not be shielded for his last two years with the KR.so 
72 See id. 
73 See Wrangling Continues on Make-Up of Former Khmer Rouge Tribunal, Asia 
Pacific Transcripts (Mar. 2, 2000) (on file with author). 
74 See Marks, mpra note 12, at 699. 
75 Bora Touch, Why Chlzottk Rin 's Acquittal Is Illegal, PHNOM PENH PosT, Aug. 4-17, 
2000, at 2 [hereinafter Chhouk Rin Acquittal]; see Law on the Outlawing of the "Demo-
cratic Kampuchea" Group, 1-eprinted in PHNOM PENH PosT, july 15-28, 1994, at 3. 
76 See Touch, S1tpra note 67. 
77 See Chhouk Rin Acquittal, supra note 75. 
78 See id. 
79 See Kimina Lyall, Life Term for Chhottk Rin After Appeal, THE WEEKEND AusTRALIAN, 
Sept. 7, 2002, at 15. 
so See id. Sary formally broke ranks with the KR leadership in 1996 and now resides in 
the Northwest territory of Pailin. 
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V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: MoRE U.N. RESISTANCE 
About a year after the Secretary General's February 2002 decision 
to terminate tribunal negotiations, the General Assembly passed a reso-
lution that strongly urged an immediate resumption of talks with Cam-
bodian authorities. 81 Reacting to this clear direction from the General 
Assembly, a U.N. delegation restarted negotiations with Cambodian 
representatives in January 2003, and the Secretary General then dis-
patched a small team to Phnom Penh in March 2003 to continue 
talks.82 On March 17, 2003, representatives from both sides initialed a 
draft agreement concerning cooperation between the U.N. and the 
Cambodian government in the establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers, and in early June these representatives formally signed the 
agreement.83 The agreement will not be formally binding unless both 
the General Assembly and the Cambodian parliament ratifY it, and re-
view on the Cambodian side is not likely to occur before late Fall 
2003.84 
What appears as an apparent breakthrough, however, is actually 
full of roadblocks that the Secretary General has placed in the path of 
a successfully formed tribunal with international involvement.85 In his 
report to the General Assembly providing background on the re-
sumed negotiations and explaining the draft agreement, the Secre-
tary General indicates that the decision to resume negotiations was 
not motivated by willing re-engagement on the part of the Legal M-
fairs Office, but by grudging acquiescence to several member states 
that insisted that the terms of the tribunal law serve as the basis for 
the negotiation.86 Additionally, the Secretary General uses the report 
81 G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 57th Sess., t 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/228 
(2002). 
82 Report of the Secretary General on Khmer Rouge Trials, U.N. General Assembly, 57th Sess., 
Agenda Item 109(b), n 9, 19, U.N. Doc. A/57/769, (2003) [hereinafter Secretary Gen-
eral's Report]. 
83 UN and Cambodia Agree on Court, BBC NEws WoRLD En., Mar. 17, 2003, at 
http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2855877.stm; UN and Carnbodia Sign Court Dea~ 
BBC NEws, June 6, 2003, at http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2968080.stm. The 
text of the draft agreement is attached to the Secretary General's Report. 
114 Secretary General's Report, supra note 82, 1 53. Cambodia completed national elec-
tions in late July 2003 and will not have a new government in place until fall 2003. Even 
once the new government is formed, there is a real possibility that the Cambodian parlia-
ment will reject the draft agreement, as it may view certain provisions as an unacceptable 
assertions of foreign control over the tribunal process. Daniel K. Donovan, joint U.N.-
CambodiaEfforts to Establish a Khmer Rouge Tribuna~ 44 HARV. INT'L LJ. 551,567 (2003). 
85 Secretary General's Report, supra note 82, 11 28, 29. 
86 /d., 21. 
2004] The U.N.'s Role in Negotiations over a Khmer Rouge Tl-ibunal 159 
as an opportunity to rehash his objections to the hybrid domes-
tic/foreign structure of the tribunal and to reiterate his belief that the 
Extraordinary Chambers in their currently contemplated form would 
not meet international standards of justice.s7 
More ominously, tl1e Secretary General notes tl1at the draft agree-
ment contains a provision allowing the U.N. to withdraw cooperation if it 
determines that tl1e Cambodian government is not fulfilling its obliga-
tions under the agreement.88 Thus, the U.N. has granted itself the right 
to abandon the tribunal formation process by unilateral action, setting 
up a repeat of the February 2002 pullout.89 
CONCLUSION 
The tribunal law passed by tl1e Cambodian legislature in August 
2001 complies with substantive principles of international justice and 
ensures independence and objectivity by requiring international par-
ticipation in every crucial phase of the tribunal's operation. By termi-
nating negotiations because of formalistic objections, and then restart-
ing talks witl1 renewed opposition to the tribunal's basic structural 
formula and the reservation of a right to opt out, the U.N. has raised 
the prospect that trials of KR leaders will occur without any foreign in-
volvement. Instead of throwing away years of painstaking work, the 
U.N. should drop its objections and right of unilateral withdrawal, so 
that it can fully assist the RGC in calling KR leaders to account for their 
heinous crimes against the Cambodian people. 
87 Id. n 2s, 29. 
88 /d. 11 30, 51. This Note does not address the details of the draft agreement, which 
allow for more U.N. control over certain aspects of the tribunal. At this juncture, the most 
salient features of the draft agreement are its informal nonbinding status, the Secretary 
General's continued opposition to the supermajority chamber structure, and the U.N.'s 
reservation of a unilateral right of withdrawal. 
89 See Statement from the Royal Government, supra note 4. 
